WITH ISRAEL TENSIONS HIGH, WHO WILL TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ABU SALMIYA’S RELEASE?
Israel on Sunday will mark nine months since the October 7 massacre and the ensuing war.
One incident this week encapsulated the messy tangle of military strategy, political divisions, international pressure, and domestic concerns that continue to shape the war’s trajectory: the release of Shifa Hospital director Muhammad Abu Salmiya.
Israelis of all political stripes were stunned to wake up Monday to the news that Abu Salmiya was one of 55 security prisoners released, and condemnations came from across the political spectrum.
Abu Salmiya’s hospital in Gaza City was a central Hamas operational hub and command center that camouflaged tunnels housing Hamas headquarters and where some Israeli hostages were taken and, in at least one case, were killed.
Abu Salmiya returned to a hero’s reception in Gaza. In Israel, his release was accompanied by an uproar symbolic of the tensions and challenges the country faces as the war enters its 10th month. Here’s a look at what this release underscored:
Internal political divisions and a failure to take responsibility
Abu Salmiya’s release exposed deep rifts and mistrust within the Israeli government and the security apparatus.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the release a “grave mistake,” while trying to shift the blame to the Supreme Court, which last week held a hearing on an appeal to close the Sde Teiman detention center where Abu Salmiya had been held and which has come under increasing international scrutiny because of allegations of torture and poor conditions.
Netanyahu was not the only one to try to shift blame: Abu Salmiya’s release unleashed the comic spectacle of the country’s leaders scrambling to deflect the responsibility onto someone else.
Netanyahu said it was not him but the security establishment that drew up the names. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant responded that the imprisonment and release of prisoners is the responsibility of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) and the Israel Prison Service.
The IPS said it was the Shin Bet’s decision; the Shin Bet said it has been warning for a year that there is insufficient space to hold security prisoners, and that the National Security Ministry – responsible for prisons and detention centers – did not act on its warnings.
National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir said he had no say in the decision, there is no problem with prison space, and that Netanyahu should stop Gallant and Shin Bet head Ronen Bar from pursuing policies independently, contrary to the positions of the security cabinet and the government.
This degree of discord reflects a broader problem: The failure of the country’s leaders to take responsibility for mishaps that occur under their watch – note that Netanyahu has yet to admit full responsibility for October 7 and draw any personal conclusions – and a lack of coordination and trust between the political and security echelons.
Disagreements between politicians and the generals are inevitable during war. What is not inevitable is that these are aired publicly, even via communiques to the media. This destructive modus operandi creates problems on two fronts.
Internally, these publicly aired disagreements are bad for morale since they broadcast to the public, whose sons and daughters are fighting and dying for the country, that those in charge of running the war are not coordinated and are bickering among themselves.
As State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman said this week in discussing whether his office should investigate the matter, “The dialogue between political and security officials that is taking place on the issue raises concerns that no organized work was done that examined all aspects of [Abu Salmiya’s] release.”
If that is the case when dealing with this issue, what does it say about the decision-making process on other, weightier ones?
Externally, Israel’s enemies also benefit from this discord, as it signals to them that the country is divided and – as a result – potentially weakened. This may encourage them to take more aggressive actions, believing that this internal strife will hamper the country’s ability to respond effectively, just as the judicial reform furor last year emboldened Hamas to attack on October 7.
Furthermore, Abu Salmiya’s release gave a morale boost to Hamas, something in itself detrimental to Israel’s interests.
The release also exposed deep divisions within the Israeli government, with ministers publicly criticizing each other and key security agencies. This does not instill public confidence in its leadership or enhance a feeling that the government knows what it is doing.
Divisions, meanwhile, emerged this week over much more significant issues than the release of a Gaza hospital director, such as whether to declare an end to the war in Gaza to win the release of at least some of the hostages and to allow the IDF to regroup in the face of a possible broader war in Lebanon, goals reportedly favored by the IDF top brass, or whether to continue the war in Gaza to downgrade Hamas further and ensure it is not standing in any capacity when the fighting stops, reportedly the position favored by Netanyahu.
Security concerns vs practical constraints
Abu Salmiya’s release highlighted the tension, in waging this war, between security considerations and dealing with practical issues like prison overcrowding.
The Shin Bet blamed the government for ignoring warnings about the need for additional detainee space, forcing the release of potentially dangerous individuals, and – perhaps even more consequentially – meaning that arrests of terrorist suspects might not be carried out in the West Bank, because there is simply nowhere to imprison them.
The struggle between security imperatives and logistical realities has been a recurring theme throughout the war. For instance, the issue of providing humanitarian aid for Gazans is a product of this tension: How do you provide assistance while ensuring that those aid trucks do not include smuggled weapons?
Another example of this dilemma is how the IDF had to deal with moving hundreds of thousands of Palestinian civilians during intense fighting (logistical realities) while maintaining its military operations (security imperatives).
The call-up of hundreds of thousands of reserve soldiers is another example of this balancing act: on the one hand, the state needs these reservists for its security; on the other, lengthy reserve duty for so many taxes both the nation’s economy and the reservists’ families.
International pressure and scrutiny
Ben-Gvir, in a KAN Reshet Bet interview, accused Bar of caving in to international pressure and worrying too much about censure from world bodies such as the International Criminal Court about conditions in Israel’s prisons.
In Ben-Gvir’s telling, Bar’s agenda is to ensure that “the world does not get mad at us, that the international community does not get angry at us.”
The head of the Shin Bet, Ben-Gvir said, wants to improve conditions for the security prisoners – which is why he released some rather than just adding more to the existing facilities – because “he is afraid of the world, he thinks [prison conditions] cause delegitimization, will get the Palestinian Authority angry, and will incite the terrorists.”
A CNN report last month that alleged abuse at the Sde Teiman detention facility attracted a great deal of international attention. Phasing out the use of this facility – which at one time held some 1,000 security prisoners – is exacerbating the problem of a lack of facilities to house prisoners.
Ben-Gvir’s comment that Bar is worried about world opinion was meant disparagingly.
Nevertheless, Bar’s doing so – aware of problems that could arise with the various international bodies due to below-standard conditions in Israel’s prisons – reflects another fixture of this war: taking steps while concerned about future international legal ramifications and balancing security needs with international law.
Erosion of unity and the complexity of the hostage situation
Abu Salmiya’s release also shows how much the country has slid back since October 7. On that day, Israel rallied together spectacularly in the face of Hamas’s barbaric attack.
Now, nine months later, internal fractures are once again on full display.
The public outcry at his release reflects a growing frustration with the war’s management, which is ultimately harmful in that it could have a chilling effect on the country’s determination, which was so strong at the war’s outset.
The release touched a particular nerve with the families of hostages, many of whom felt betrayed that Israel would allow someone like Abu Salmiya to go free without getting anything whatsoever in return, and as their loved ones continue to rot in Hamas tunnels – the same tunnels his hospital was used to shield.
It also highlights the complexity of the hostage situation, underscoring the challenges of pursuing this war while the hostages are being held, and revealing yet again the tremendous emotional toll the hostage issue is taking on Israeli society.
Nine months into a war that Israel neither wanted nor started, the country has impressive achievements on the battlefield: it has killed, captured, or wounded more than half of Hamas’s fighters, almost wholly destroyed Hamas’s rocket manufacturing capabilities, and destroyed much of its key strategic asset: its vast underground tunnel labyrinth. As it winds down its operations in Rafah and takes control of the Philadelphi Corridor between Gaza and Egypt, Israel has also largely choked off Hamas’s ability to rearm.
Yet, as Abu Salmiya’s release this week illustrated, Israel still must grapple with complex issues that extend well beyond the battlefield: Resurgent internal divisions, the ongoing struggle to balance security needs with practical considerations, and the pressure of international scrutiny.
Nine months on, that is still a very tall order indeed.
2024-07-05T16:16:45Z dg43tfdfdgfd
